U.S. post-war diplomacy was strongly influenced by the executive agreements reached in Cairo, in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam.485 For a time, the formal treaty – the signing of the UN Charter and the entry into multinational defence pacts such as NATO, SEATO, CENTRO and others – was restored, but soon the executive agreement was restored in addition to the agreement or only by an initiative of the President. , has once again become the main instrument of U.S. foreign policy, so that in the 1960s it became clear that the nation was obliged, in one way or another, to help more than half of the world`s countries protect themselves.486 The turmoil in Congress did not result in anything essential than the adoption of a „sense of the Senate“ resolution that expresses a desire to defend itself. „National commitments“ will be made more solemn in the future than in the past.486 The turmoil in Congress has not resulted in anything more essential than the adoption of a „sense of the Senate“ resolution expressing the wish that „commitments „national“ are made more solemn in the future than in the past.487 The turmoil in Congress has not resulted in anything more essential than the adoption of a resolution of the „meaning of the Senate“ 487 The United States government , in the United States v. Pink (1942) found that international treaty agreements have the same legal status as treaties and do not require Senate approval. To Reid v. Concealed (1957), the Tribunal, while reaffirming the President`s ability to enter into executive agreements, found that such agreements could not be contrary to existing federal law or the Constitution. The overlap of contractual power through cooperation between Congress and the executive branch in international agreements is also illustrated by the use of resolutions approving U.S. membership in international organizations458 and participation in international conventions.459 The significant extension of presidential power in this area was first manifested in President McKinley`s government.
At the beginning of the war with Spain, the President announced that the United States would be bound by the last three principles of the Paris Declaration for the duration, a course that, as Professor Wright points out, „would undoubtedly go a long way to defining these three principles as an international law, mandatory for the United States in future wars.“ 473 Hostilities with Spain ended in August 1898 with a ceasefire, the terms of which largely determine the subsequent peace treaty,474, as well as the ceasefire of 11 November 1918, largely determine the conditions for final peace with Germany in 1918. It was also President McKinley who, in 1900, relied solely on his sole authority as commander-in-chief, brought a 5,000-strong ground force and a naval force to work with similar contingents of other powers to save the beijing legations from boxers; A year later, without consulting Congress or the Senate, he accepted for the United States the protocol for compensation for boxers between China and the intermediate powers.475 Commenting on the Beijing Protocol, Willoughby quotes with his consent the following remark: „This case is interesting because it shows how the force of circumstances has forced us to adopt European practice in reference to an international agreement. which, with the exception of the issue of compensation, was almost exclusively political in nature.